KNOWLEDGE DOSSIER · Sécurité

Indirect prompt injection through Web content

Separate authorized instructions from untrusted retrieved Web content.

Edition: 13 November 2026 Extended dossier Scientific review pending
AT A GLANCE
TypeIndirect prompt injection through Web content
AudienceLearners, creators, developers and digital decision-makers
01

The trust boundary

A retrieved page, search result or document can embed a hostile instruction targeting the assistant. The model may confuse external text with higher-trust instructions. The attack need not be obvious to a human reading the page.

02

Beyond visible jailbreaks

Indirect injection becomes especially dangerous when a system can call tools or access private data. A page claiming to contain system instructions has no privilege merely because it was retrieved.

03

Layered defenses

Separate untrusted content, restrict permissions, enforce tool-call policies, detect anomalous outputs and require confirmation for sensitive actions. Neither filtering nor system prompting provides an absolute guarantee.

04

Test with controlled scenarios

Create tests where a sample document contains requests for disclosure or unauthorized actions. The system should still summarize the page without following the embedded instructions.

05

External documents are not instructions

A retrieved page or file may contain text designed to redirect an agent, sometimes pretending to be a system instruction. Its presence in search results grants no privilege. Systems must isolate external data, constrain tool calls and recognize the fragility of keyword-only defenses.

06

Reproducible resistance test

Create fictional pages containing harmless adversarial instructions alongside relevant passages. The system should answer the legitimate question without following hidden instructions. Measure prohibited actions and excessive refusals, then inspect logs. One successful test does not prove universal attack resistance.

HOW IT FITS TOGETHER

Core steps

  1. 01Identify untrusted inputs
  2. 02Constrain tool privileges
  3. 03Test controlled malicious content
  4. 04Audit tool calls
CRITICAL THINKING

Three questions to ask

  • Is the page content itself a trusted instruction?

  • Do tools have only necessary privileges?

  • Does a sensitive action require approval?

PRIMARY SOURCES

Read the source documents

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